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EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES NAVY AMPHIBIOUS LANDING DOCTRINE 
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Leaving World War I and heading into World War II the United States Navy had 
to prepare for an unforeseen future on the open seas. After the attack on Pearl Harbor the 
United States was thrust into World War II and needed an effective amphibious landing 
doctrine to be able to counter adversary advances. This thesis covers the evolution of 
landing doctrine from the beginning to the end of World War II while highlighting the 
impacts that Operations Torch, Husky, Shingle, and Overlord had on the Navy's landing 
doctrine after the war. 
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In any organization, efficient and adequate management and operating procedures 
are vital to success.   For the military, these goals are achieved through doctrine.  Military 
doctrine outlines standard procedures for training, readiness, and combat.  It provides 
guidance for harmonious conduct by its subcomponent commands.  Throughout history, 
military doctrine has had to adapt to changing technology, a changing geopolitical 
climate, and constant evaluation.  This thesis will evaluate the United States Navy’s 
amphibious landing doctrine before, during, and in the months leading to the end of 
World War II.  Although there is residual decision-making left to be made at the tactical 
level of warfare, there is significance in comprehending the functionality of doctrine at 
the strategic level of war. 
Doctrine  
For the United States Department of Defense, procedures are laid out in doctrine.  
While doctrine is instructional and authoritative somewhat like an order, its application 
requires a level of judgment relative to the situation.1 Doctrine may be deviated from at 
the commander's discretion.  Doctrine, like warfare, may be broken up into three 
segments: strategic, operational, and tactical.  The easiest way of viewing these types of 
doctrine is as if they were a part of a tree, a doctrine tree.  At the top, you have the all-
encompassing strategic level doctrine.  Strategic level doctrine covers national policy and 
independent theatre strategy.  This level of doctrine focuses on utilizing national 
resources for theatre level success of military operations and is directed by the President 
of the United States with assistance from the National Security Council (NSC).2 Once 
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Strategic level doctrine is established, the Secretary of Defense relays this to combatant 
commanders and joint force commanders who develop operational level doctrine, the 
next tier down on the doctrine tree.  While not present during World War II, Operational 
level doctrine is set by each combatant commander or joint force commander with the 
goal of acting in accordance with and satisfying strategic doctrine.  The focus of 
operational level doctrine is to “develop strategies, campaigns, and operations and 
employ military forces”.3 Operational level doctrine combines strategy and tactics to 
create operational objectives necessary to meet strategic goals.  Finally, the tactical level 
doctrine covers the location and utilization of forces.  This level of doctrine is where 
actual battles, skirmishes, and engagements occur.  Figure 1 shows the relationship of the 
different levels of warfare which are the basis for different levels of doctrine.  Doctrine is 
laid out through government publications like the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and 
the National Security Strategy (NSS).  The National Defense Strategy outlines the 
Department of Defense objectives while the National Security Strategy examines the 
United States’ more broad strategy of securing the nation through all means of the 
government.  The NSS states that “our fundamental responsibility is to protect the 
American people, the homeland, and the American way of life”.4 Some strategies like the 
NDS have classified full versions and unclassified summaries.  Strategies like the NSS 
are broad and open-source, non-classified materials for public dissemination.  In the 
unclassified release of the NDS, the Department of Defense shows what it is currently 
shaping its strategic doctrine towards by saying “Inter-state strategic competition, not 
 
3 (CJCS 2013) 
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terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S.  national security”.5 The NDS and the NSS 
are vital precursors to doctrine and can show where top military leaders want our doctrine 
to go.  Leading up to, and during World War II, the foreshadowing of doctrine was not as 
publicly available as it is today. 
Heading into World War II 
Prior to American entry into World War I, the United States Navy embarked on a 
massive naval order of battle expansion.  Approved by Congress in 1916, the Naval 
Expansion Act of 1916 allowed for ten battleships, six battle cruisers, ten scout cruisers, 
fifty destroyers, and sixty-seven submarines to be built within the following three years.6 
Based on the theory of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the Naval Expansion Act of 1916 gained 
support through the United States’ goal of a thriving nation through extensive 
 
5 (Trump 2017) 
6 (Halpern 2014) 
Figure 1: Levels of Warfare (CJCS,2013) 
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commercial sea lanes which required a strong naval presence for protection.7 President 
Woodrow Wilson believed that if the United States were to pursue naval expansion, that 
it may undercut his efforts at obtaining a peaceful end to World War I.  It was only after 
German submarines began killing Americans that President Wilson realized the need for 
the United States Navy to be ready to defend the nation and its people.  This massive 
buildup of ships prior to the war had created purpose for the First International 
Conference on Limitations of Naval Armaments, also called the Washington Conference, 
after the war.  Starting on November 11th, 1921, this conference hosted by the United 
States included representatives from eight nations including China, France, Japan, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium, and Great Britain; it ended with the establishment of a 
five-nation power treaty (Five-Power Treaty) between the United States, Great Britain, 
Japan, France, and Italy on February 6th, 1922.8 During the conference, these nations 
agreed to one of the first arms reduction treaties in modern history.  Led by United States 
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, the agreement also included provisions of 
limiting tonnage of capital ships and aircraft carriers, the United States, Great Britain, and 
France to scrap finite amounts of ships (1.9 million tons), set a strict ratio of capital ships 
(ships weighing over 10,000 tons) and set more strict rules for surface warfare for the 
Five Powers, and set a status quo for naval fortifications in the western Pacific ocean.9 
The agreements made by the United States during the First International Conference on 
Limitations of Naval Armaments would shape its naval strategy leading up to its entrance 
into World War II.   
 
7 (Kirschbaum 2008) 
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Japan had threatened to terminate the agreement it had made during the 
Washington Conference and demanded to be treated equally with the United States and 
Great Britain with respect to the buildup of capital ships.  When this request was rejected 
by the other Five-Power nations in 1936, Japan provided its official notice of their intent 
to permanently terminate the Five-Power Treaty.10 Also, in 1936 at the Second London 
Naval Treaty, Japan and Italy refused to sign a modified version of the original treaty 
signed at the Washington Conference.11 With Japan and Italy breaking away from the 
naval agreements, western powers had to begin to prepare for an unforeseen future on the 
open seas. 
 
10 (E. Editors 2019) 
11 (National Museum of the U.S. Navy 2019) 
Figure 2: The United States Delegation to the conference, photographed on the steps of the State-War-
Navy Building, Pennsylvania Ave. At 17th St., Washington, D.C., in November 1921. Among those 
present are: Admiral Robert E. Coontz, USN Chief (National Museum of the U.S. Navy 2019) 
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Leading up to World War II, the Japanese military was split into two separate 
entities: the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA).  Japan 
had foreseen China, Russia, and the United States as their three main enemies for the 
fast-approaching war; the IJA would primarily handle the war with China and Russia 
while the IJN would primarily manage the war with the United States.12 After conducting 
their final round of war games on October 4th and 5th and with the final plan approved on 
the 22nd, the Japanese were ready to launch the attack on Pearl Harbor.  At 0755 a.m. on 
December 7th, 1941 Japan launched its raid on Pearl Harbor killing over 2,300 Americans 
and launching the United States into World War II.   
Now that the United States was thrust into World War II, the United States Navy 
needed to be ready to fight at all levels.  To be ready to effectively fight and win the 
Second World War, key United States military leaders realized that amphibious 
operations would be vital to Allied success in the War.  The United States Navy and 
Army needed a thorough and effective amphibious landing doctrine for the war.  The 
United States Marine Corps utilized the Navy’s Landing Operations Doctrine, 1938 to 
generate their field manual titled Landing Operations on Hostile Shores.13 Furthermore, 
the United States Army copied this instruction laid out by the Marine Corps to have its 
own amphibious doctrine.  This thesis will examine and analyze the changes to United 
States Amphibious Doctrine through World War II from the view of landings before the 
war in Landing Operations on Hostile Shores (FM 31-5) to the viewpoint during the war 
in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy (FTP-155), and finally with the adoption of War 
 
12 (Caravaggio 2014) 
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Instructions 1944 (FTP-143) by Chief of Naval Operations Ernie King closer to the end 
of the war.   
Landing Operations on Hostile Shores  
 The United States Navy’s Landing Operations Doctrine was published by the 
Office of Naval Operations on May 2nd, 1941.  Landing Operations Doctrine supersedes 
the United States Navy’s Tentative Landing Operations Manual of 1935 and is a guide 
for Navy and Marine forces whose mission is to conduct land operations against 
adversaries.14 The United States Army was able to transform Landing Operations 
Doctrine into their own publication on June 2nd, 1941.  The resulting publication, 
Landing Operations on Hostile Shores focuses on guiding strictly Army forces during 
amphibious landing operations on adversary territory.15 Divided into eleven subsections, 
Landing Operations on Hostile Shores guides the war planner and fighter through each 
stage of the amphibious landing.   
 First, Landing Operations on Hostile Shores defines the purpose of joint oversea 
expeditions as “combined Army and Navy forces dispatched to a theatre of operations by 
sea for the purpose of undertaking military operations ashore which may involve… the 
securing of a beachhead from which to project major land operations… seizure and 
securing of an area for use in connection with other military operations; or for use to 
carry out further operations…seizure and securing of an area in order to deny its use to 
the enemy, and the destruction of enemy installations and facilities”.16 This doctrine lays 
out four stages to successful overseas expeditions starting with the concentration and 
 
14 (War Department 1941) 
15 (War Department 1941) 
16 (War Department 1941) 
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specialized training phase, then the embarkation phase, the movement phase, and 
finishing with the landing phase.17 The concentration and specialized training phase 
trains landing forces in similarly situated environments as the desired adversary 
beachhead.  The embarkation phase compiles all the applicable troops and their 
equipment and transports them to the desired pre-landing location.  The movement phase 
occurs during the time when the troops depart the allied port and before the rendezvous at 
the desired adversary landing area.  Finally, the landing phase is the expeditionary 
movement of troops onto the beachhead until landing forces are securely established on 
the adversary shore.18  
 When conducting landing operations, numerous considerations must be made.  
Landing Operations on Hostile Shores outlines the need to consider the nature of 
operations, special organization, and special equipment needed for a successful landing.19 
These considerations led to the distinct and outlined plans for the landing force after the 
basic plan has been made with the aforementioned considerations.20 The plans for the 
landing force include planning of special training, troop movement from concentration 
centers to ports of embarkations, loading the transports, and finally the plan to debark 
with ship-to-shore movement and ashore operations.21 Each stage of the planning process 
requires centralization due to the complexity of oversea landing operations.   
 The amphibious landing is broken into three landing phases in Landing 
Operations on Hostile Shores.  Landing phase one includes the seizure of terrain 
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immediately in the rear of the beach, then when sufficient land has been secured, forces 
advance inland about 10,000 yards which secures the beach from enemy light artillery 
fire.22 Moving landing forces another 15,000 yards inland denying the enemy of medium 
artillery fire on the beach is the second landing phase.23 The third and final landing phase 
encompasses the entire use of land and air assets to secure the objective for which the 
landing was undertaken.24 The ultimate success of the tactical plan depends most heavily 
on the first landing phase.  Demonstrations are a unique and complementary phase of the 
landing operation in which exhibitions of force are displayed in a way to divert enemy 
reserves from tending to the main landing operation.25 Knowing how to effectively place 
forces is dependent on the landing environment.  Landing areas that possess favorable 
landing terrain are the most heavily fortified by the adversary.  The converse is also true 
due to the nature of expeditionary movement in that the least landing-favorable beaches 
are not as fortified.  In selecting the final location for the landing, the correct decision 
considers the needs of the force and their equipment while also mitigating the capabilities 
of the adversary at the location.  Once the location for the landing has been selected, the 
next decision that must be made is the timing of the landing.  Night landings typically 
ensure that tactical surprise is upheld, while daylight allows for the full employment of 
naval and air support.  Initial landing forces are to normally be employed under the cover 
of night with the transport of the main landing force during dawn so that the main force 
experiences full naval and air support.  In whole, Landing Operations on Hostile Shores 
describes that the effective employment of the three landing phases in conjunction with 
 
22 (War Department 1941) 
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demonstrations, properly selected beach, and strategic timing will lead to a successful 
landing operation.   
 The final portion of Landing Operations on Hostile Shores that is vital in 
understanding the United States' view on amphibious landings heading into the war is the 
ship-to-shore movement of forces onto the beachheads.  Ship-to-shore movement 
involves the fire and movement coordinated with small boats transporting the troops onto 
shore.  Leading with gunfire to both destroy and demoralize the enemy, the gunfire is to 
increase in severity until “masked by the assaulting infantry”.26 The approaching landing 
infantry begins their approach to the beachhead in large columns but due to the increased 
risk of loss the closer the small boats get to shore; the deployed forces break down into 
smaller columns of small boats.27 The breakdown of the small boats into smaller columns 
allows for reserves to be properly positioned on the beach to capitalize on the success of 
previous waves.  This breakdown continues through landing groups and through boat 
groups.28 
To ensure continuity of effective operations, the infantry and small boat units are 
split into two groupings: the landing group and the boat group.  Landing groups are 
composed of and organized by a number, followed by the name of the principal 
organization.  For example, Landing Group No.  1 (1st Bn 1st Inf, rein) is Landing Group 
Number 1 composed of the 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry, and their reinforcements.29 Landing 
groups are compiled as a table which includes all the forces in each landing group for all 
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necessary landing groups.  This table allocates the spaces on the small boat taken up by 
the personnel and equipment for each unit in each landing group.   
Small boats grouped together with the mission of transporting landing forces from 
ship to shore are organized into boat groups.  Each boat group is given a unique number 
identifier, Boat Group 1, and is led by a naval officer who is the boat group commander.  
When two or more boat groups require the command of a single officer, this organization 
of boat groups is called a boat flotilla.30 Boat divisions are composed of two or more 
small boats transporting landing groups to the beachhead.  Boat divisions are called by 
their division and group number such as Boat Division No.  1, Boat Group No.  1.31 Boat 
groups move from sea to shore depending on the plan for the tactical employment of the 
infantry battalion which is also dependent on the terrain on the landing area.  During the 
landing operations, reserve boat groups stand by in designated sea areas until called upon 
to deploy reinforced landing forces.   
The Army’s field manual, which is the exact same as the Marine Corps doctrine, 
Landing Operations on Hostile Shores was the foundation for United States amphibious 
landings heading into World War II.  This doctrine focused on the importance of 
planning and strong force organization for successful landings.  Landing Operations on 
Hostile Shores outlined the importance of coordination between the United States Navy 
and the Army as a basis for further successful landings.32 In the years following Landing 
Operations on Hostile Shores and during World War II, the United States Navy and the 
Army modified existing joint doctrine to better establish amphibious landing procedures.  
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The resulting updated doctrine, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy of July 14th, 1941 
outlined improved command, planning, and embarkation measures to guide the United 
States Army and Navy through the rest of the war.   
Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 
The goal of the newly revised Joint Action of the Army and the Navy was to better 
coordinate action between the Army and the Navy to produce the most effective support 
which is vital to the success realized in war.33 Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 
established a clear and mutual understanding of the functions executed by each branch 
for attaining optimal coordination of effort during the operation. 
Joint Action of the Army and the Navy outlines the general functions of the Army 
and the Navy together and separately in Chapter 1 of the publication.  Together, the 
Army and the Navy defend the United States from foreign and domestic enemies.  They 
jointly accomplish this by complementing each other’s foundational mission set.  The 
Army focuses on land superiority while the Navy maintains sea superiority.  In joint 
operations, the Army and the Navy must work together with one equivalent branch 
commander supporting the other branch commander in charge of the operation.34 During 
joint operations, the respective branches should refrain from establishing operational 
limitations on the other and should instead focus on collaboration resulting in operation 
success.35 The Army supports the Navy in terms of the establishment and defense of 
naval bases and by providing the adequate number of forces needed for joint overseas 
expeditions.  The Navy complements Army operations through maintaining access and 
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control of sea lanes vital to the national security interests of the nation as a whole.  The 
control of these sea lanes maintained by the United States Navy allows for United States 
Army access to the entire world which in turn allows the Army to provide the Navy ports 
in these new nations.   
 Joint actions between the Army and the Navy require principled leadership and 
effective communication with the focus on victory.  To determine the commander of such 
operations, the services determine, through joint operation planning, which branch has 
paramount interest;36 the service whose operations are of greater importance to the 
accomplishment of a joint mission.  The commander of the joint force is vested with 
control of the operation and the responsibility for effectively coordinating and executing 
for victory.37 The commander can accomplish this through the exercise of unity of 
command or limited unity of command.  Unity of command is established when one 
commander is provided the responsibility of the entire operation supplemented by 
support provided by the other service branch commensurate commander.38 This 
established commander can coordinate forces from both services for the operation.  This 
is the major difference from limited unity of command where the joint operation 
commander does not have the ability to control the action of the opposite service.39 
Conducting joint overseas expeditions, including amphibious landings, regardless of the 
unity of command structure, requires clear communication and proper planning.   
 The joint operation planning process for amphibious landings is unique in that it 
requires oversight of both the Army and the Navy.  When the decision is made to conduct 
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such an operation, the authority arriving at this conclusion will issue a directive to the 
commander of the combined force being utilized for the operation.40 The directive will be 
detailed and include but not limited to the following:41 
1. Digest of available information of the enemy.   
2. Information of any prior operations undertaken that might have an influence upon 
the proposed operation. 
3. Information of any supporting operations contemplated. 
4. The joint mission and, if required, the separate missions for the Army and the 
Navy. 
5. The outline of the operations that probably will be required to accomplish the 
mission or missions, with designation of the initial theatre of operations.   
6. The force assigned to carry out the operations with times and places of 
concentration and availability for embarkation.   
7. The type of special equipment and supplies that may be needed.   
8. The availability of sea transportation and the responsibility for its procurement 
and operation.   
9. The method of coordination.  The designation of the commander in chief under 
the method of unity of command; or the designation of the service in which 
paramount interest will be vested during each phase, with the designation of the 
respective commanders of the Navy and Navy forces.   
10. Any further information or instructions that may be considered of importance in 
order to give the commander in chief or the respective commanders of the Army 
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and Navy forces the benefit of all studies made which might have a bearing on the 
success of the expedition.   
It is of significant importance that the authority is as detailed and clear as possible 
when issuing the directive to the applicable commander.  Once the directive is received 
by the selected commander of the joint force, this commander will issue an instruction 
further down the chain of command to the respective commanders of the Army and Navy 
forces required for the execution of the plan.42 The instruction passed down from the 
joint commander will include but is not limited to:43 
1. Decision 
2. Such additional assignments of the Army and Navy missions as appear to be 
necessary.   
3. Operations to be undertaken, including both, join operations and such separate 
Army and Navy operations as are considered to be necessary to ensure the success 
of the expedition, together with the designation of the respective task forces 
required and their commanders.   
4. Announcement of selected landing areas.   
5. Times and places of embarkation, departure, and rendezvous.   
6. Provision for joint training.   
7. Provision for logistic support of the expedition.   
8. Provision for communications (signal) between forces.   
9. Announcement of the hour of landing.  Often this may not be announced until 
shortly before the landing forces are ready to embark.   
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10. Alternative plans.   
The above instructions will be provided to the appropriate commanders of both the 
specific Army and Navy forces needed to carry out the operation.  With full detailed 
instructions, the third echelon of commanders will better be able to ready their forces and 
provide the requisite training needed for operational success.  Once the third and final 
echelon of commanders has the requisite information on the operation, the forces begin 
the preparatory phase of the joint operation.44 
First, the medium of sea transportation must be clearly established between the two 
branches.  Unless otherwise stated by the plan or directive, the commander of the force 
having paramount interest will have the necessary transportation vehicle requested or 
built through the Navy or War Departments.  Next, the port of embarkation is chosen, 
organized, and managed by agencies of the War Department.  Then at the more tactical 
level, the Army forces reduce, as much as possible, the equipment they bring with them 
to the absolutely necessary items to conduct the operation.  While reduction occurs, it is 
vital to operational success that this reduction does not, in turn, reduce force lethality and 
ability to obtain mission success.  Special equipment needed by the joint force will be 
provided by the Navy.  Special equipment, in this case, includes that which will be 
utilized to protect the Army forces on land; machine guns, barges, and landing craft for 
the Army’s artillery, tanks, and supplies.  After such reduction plans are made, joint 
training occurs due to the inherent intricacies of landing large Army forces with little sea 
experience on a hostile shore and with Naval forces unfamiliarity of land operations.45 
Embarkation planning occurs after training is completed and includes determining the 
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exact number of personnel (officer, warrant officer, and enlisted) and equipment and their 
respective space needed to transport.  Other aspects of the embarkation cannot be planned 
due to the ever-changing nature of amphibious landings.   The final phase of the 
preparatory stage is the loading of the previously mentioned units.  Loading is conducted 
using two main methods: (1): Commercial Loading and (2) Unit Loading.  Commercial 
loading utilizes maximum ship space regardless of tactical employment of Army forces 
while unit loading considers the need for Army forces to be tactically employed.46 The 
decision on which loading method to be used depends on the objective and location of the 
joint operation.  If the force is strictly being transported from one secured base to another 
secured base, then commercial loading will be utilized.  Conversely, if the objective is to 
invade an enemy shoreline and tactical employment of Army forces is required, then unit 
loading will be used.  After the method of transportation is decided, the Army and Navy 
forces begin the transit overseas.   
Inherently, the Navy is responsible for the protection of all assets and lines of 
communication during sea transit.47 The naval commander of the joint operation will 
procure a convoy and escort for the transit.  A selected naval officer will be placed in 
command of each component of the convoy.  While the sea transit occurs, Army 
personnel aboard the Navy vessels cannot interfere with the conduction of safe convoy 
and escort for the transit.  Upon successful transit to the area of operations, the Army 
forces are ready to deploy to the shore and conduct offensive operations.   
Offensive amphibious landing operations conducted on enemy shores will utilize both 
Navy and Army aircraft support as much as possible.  The Army has three successive 
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phases for the joint operation.  The first phase includes acquiring terrain in the rear of the 
beach.  When supplementary forces arrive, Army forces will then advance and secure 
additional portions of the shore to the extent that secures the beach from enemy short 
artillery fire (10,000 yards).  Eliminating the enemy’s ability to launch medium-range 
artillery fire (15,000 yards) is the objective of the second phase.  Waves of forces will be 
made by as frequently as needed given land and sea abilities and to achieve the required 
object.  However, additional forces will not be employed to the point of detrimental 
dispersion.  While the Army achieves its objective on land, the Navy provides support 
from the nearby sea.   
During the landing operation, the Navy is responsible for ensuring that all Army 
personnel arrive on the coast as safe as possible.  This includes employment of naval 
aviation assets, signals communications, and all other functions necessary to ensure the 
landing of Army forces on the coast.  The Navy will organize its forces by the following 
subgroups:  
1. The fire support group, consisting of combatant naval vessels which are assigned 
the following fire missions: Against enemy troops opposing the landing or against 
their probable positions; against reserves; against hostile machine guns and hostile 
artillery; and on hostile routes of advance or retreat.  Effective results may further 
be obtained by close-in support of light vessels, such as destroyers, delivering 
direct fire 
2. The air group, consisting of naval aircraft, for observations of gunfire of the fire 
support group and the Army’s artillery, for protection of the attack force against 
enemy air operations, for reconnaissance of enemy positions, for bombing enemy 
19 
 
objectives, and for liaison with the Army forces.  Where practicable, observation 
units should support each division's landings.  It should be noted, however, that 
the fleet air forces, in the theatre of operations, other than planes carried on 
battleships and cruisers, are normally organized into a single task force, with the 
mission of supporting the landing of the expeditionary force and the operations of 
the attacking forces.   
3. The mine group, consisting of mine-laying vessels and mine sweepers for the 
purpose of sweeping the landing area clear of enemy mines and of laying 
defensive mines to protect the vessels of the attack force from enemy submarines 
and night torpedo attack.   
4. The antisubmarine group, consisting of the vessels designated to protect against 
the vessels of the attack force from attack by enemy submarines. 
5. The transport group, consisting of the transports and all noncombatant vessels 
carrying troops, equipment, and supplies.   
6. The screening group, consisting of those vessels designated to locate and give 
warning of the approach of enemy vessels attacking if possible.  This group 
usually includes the submarines accompanying the expedition.   
7. Salvage group, consisting of such light craft as may be available for rescuing 
personnel of distressed boats, hauling off grounded boats, and the recovery of 
sunken equipment.   
These subgroups will help obtain, secure, and maintain the landing area for the joint 
operation.  While the selection of the landing area is dependent on tactical considerations, 
the Army and the Navy both have their respective viewpoints on the ideal landing area.  
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The Army views a beneficial landing area as an area which will permit both approach and 
landings from a broad front commensurate with the size of the landing force, afford 
sufficient amount of favorable beaches for landing, contain no natural obstacles hindering 
beach-advance but contain natural obstacles that provide flanking cover, afford for 
sufficient inland force maneuvering and beachhead establishment, and permit the landing 
of heavy equipment including artillery, supplies.48 Conversely, the Navy suggests 
selecting a landing area free from severe obstructions to navigation, not have a beach 
slope that could cause beaching of a vessel, and be sheltered from harsh sea conditions 
that could impede landing operations or their support.49 Between the Army and the Navy, 
the landing area is chosen based on a reasonable probability to achieve the underlying 
objective.  The principle of paramount interest also applies here, and it is deemed by 
Joint Action of the Army and the Navy that paramount interest in the selection of the 
landing area will fall upon the Army due to their employment onshore is considered 
paramount.50 Accompanying the selection of the landing area is the selection of the hour 
of landing.   
 The decision made on the hour of landing also falls on the commander of the 
force having paramount interest.  Consideration taken is to advantages of landing during 
dark or light conditions and for the possibility of the utilization of smoke.  While landing 
during the dark offers tactical surprise and reduced expected troop loss, landing during 
the daylight affords more effective support to Army forces through aviation and naval 
assets.  Regardless of the time chosen and from an Army standpoint, there must follow 
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sufficient daylight for Army forces to accomplish the objective of their first phase.  From 
a Navy standpoint, the approach must be made in a manner that minimizes the risk of 
detection.  This includes necessary mine-sweeping and laying operations to protect the 
landing of Army forces.   
 A key to a successful amphibious landing operation is the effective employment 
of aviation assets and naval gunfire support.  Army air units will be deployed as early as 
possible with Navy air assets being used to complement and supplement their Army 
counterparts.  Naval gunfire support to the landing Army units will be the only type of 
that kind provided in the beginning stages of the landing.  Two methods are laid out in 
Joint Action of the Army and the Navy pertaining to the employment of naval gunfire in 
support of multiple Army ground forces.  The first method established control over the 
naval gunfire to the highest-ranking commander of the Army ground forces, while the 
second method splits up the naval gunfire support amongst the Army ground forces.  The 
choice between the two methods is made at the tactical level.  Nevertheless, the 
organization of the Army forces on the landing area remains consistent.   
 Army force organization on the beach is vital to the success of the landing 
operation.  The organization of forces on the beach is broken down into six categories.  
First, the beachmaster, a Navy officer, commands the area from the high-water mark 
seaward.51 Landing with the first wave of infantry, the beachmaster manages Army 
messages from shore to the supporting ships at sea.  Second, the shore party commander, 
an Army officer, is appointed for each beach at which a landing is to be made.52 The 
shore commander takes command of all engineer and labor troops and their movement 
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along with maneuver of equipment, supplies, and coordinates with the shore party 
commander.  Third, due to the inherent confusion associated with the amphibious 
landing, military police forces are deployed to the beach to assist the shore party 
commander and to effectively place Army forces during times of irregular troop arrival.53 
Fourth, the boat repair party repairs landing vessels that sustained casualties during the 
approach and landing of Army forces on the beach.54 Fifth and finally, medical service 
responsibility on the beachfront is split into two areas.55 The Army is responsible for 
bringing men from the battle line to the hostile shoreline where the Navy assumes 
responsibility from this hostile shoreline to the designated friendly shoreline.   
 Upon either successful completion or deemed failure, troop withdrawal may 
occur.  It is vital the withdrawal occurs with a level of secrecy and with maintained air 
superiority.  To the greatest extent possible, the withdrawal will stand by until favorable 
weather conditions are met as determined by the naval areological service.  The final 
decision to withdrawal is made jointly by the Army and Navy commanders in control of 
the amphibious landing and approved by the authority having jurisdiction over the joint 
operation.   
 Joint Action of the Army and the Navy lays out a specific strategic doctrine for 
implementation in amphibious landing operations.  While there is residual decision-
making left to be made at the tactical level, it is vital that there is a clear standard set for 
amphibious landing commanders to consider during their planning.  The United States 
Army and Navy utilized Landing Operations on Hostile Shores to help modernize Joint 
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Action of the Army and the Navy, yet the Navy relied more upon their experiences 
conducting amphibious landings to draft the more modern landing instruction in War 
Instructions 1944.   
Landings Leading up to War Instructions 1944  
Shortly after Japan’s attack on the United States Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, 
Germany and Italy had declared war on the United States on December 11th, 1941.56 
Germany, having experienced success through persistence early on in the war had 
defeated the British at Tobruk led by Nazi General Erwin Rommel on the 27th of 
November 1941.57 Needing to act fast, the Allies, through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 
developed a plan to lead an invasion in Northern Africa.  The army general they chose to 
lead the invasion of North Africa was future Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and 
United States President, Gen.  Dwight D.  Eisenhower.  Due to the unsuccessful Dieppe 
Raid in August of 1942, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed that an 
attack in North Africa would disrupt Vichy France’s control of the region and open the 
Mediterranean Sea for allied shipping lanes.58 
The landing, named Operation Torch would target and land in North Africa on 
three fronts: the western task force in Casablanca, the central task force in Oran, and the 
eastern task force in Algiers.  Operation Torch included American and British military 
units consisting of their respective armies and navies.  The eastern task force set for 
Algiers was the riskiest of the three fronts due to its proximity to other enemy bases and 
assets.  The assault on Algiers suffered vast casualties from the Axis forces assets 
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stationed close to the landing site.59 Even though the Allied forces undertook severe 
losses, the city of Algiers still surrendered at 1800 on the day of the attack.  Despite delay 
and disruption due to unexpected sandbars, the amphibious landing at Oran was also a 
quickly achieved operation.  The landing at Safi began on November 8th when French 
forces fired upon the American destroyer-transport ship BERNADOU during its approach 
to their harbor.  According to the plan, land forces were on the beach at Safi by 1600 that 
same evening.60 While only operational for a few months, the carrier, SANTEE (CVE-29), 
provided the land troops with the necessary air support.  By November 9th, the American 
land forces had stifled the French air power and had themselves gone on the offensive 
destroying dozens of French air assets.  The following day, the operation at Safi was such 
a success that some American forces were diverted north to assist in the battle for 
Casablanca.61 The Allied landings in North Africa had turned the tide for the Allies in the 
region.  The Allies were now on the offensive and showing the German-led Axis forces 
that momentum was changing ever so slightly.   
The landings during Operation Torch taught the United States important lessons 
for executing amphibious landings moving forward.  As evidenced in the changes to U.S.  
amphibious landing doctrine, Operation Torch taught the United States that the full 
utilization of naval and air assets to support the beach-embarking land troops was a 
catalyst to the success of the landings.  Joint considerations for the operational 
environment was also a key takeaway from Operation Torch.  On one front there was an 
environmental obstacle in the form of a sandbar that briefly hindered the United States 
 
59 (Lohse and Middaugh 2018) 
60 (Lohse and Middaugh 2018) 
61 (Lohse and Middaugh 2018) 
25 
 
Navy’s operational capabilities and on another front was the unfamiliarity of the 
adversary's capabilities.  Moving forward the United States and its allies would take these 
key lessons from Operation Torch and ensure that future landings would not embrace the 
same difficulties. 
Following the success of Operation Torch, the next step for the advance of Allied 
forces was to move forward onto Italy.  The foundation for further operations in Italy was 
to be laid by Operation Husky with the natural landings site for the Allies being Sicily.62 
While initially unsure of the strategic value of the operation, the Allies realized that the 
success of the operation would “divert and disperse Axis forces, and… significantly 
lessen the presence of enemy air assets in the western Mediterranean”.63 Official 
planning for Operation Husky began in February of 1943 and concluded with landing 
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rehearsals from the 22nd of June to the 4th of July.64 Further building upon the success of 
Operation Torch, the Allies used their new site at Oran as the staging port for Operation 
Husky.65 Following the mitigation of weather delays and operational hindrances, D-Day 
for Operation Husky commenced on July 10th, 1943 with the landing of “over 3,200 
ships, craft, and boats made up the Allied naval forces, of which more than 1,700 
comprised the Western Naval Task Force”.66 Early in the execution of Operation Husky 
the landing efforts were largely successful with the only main challenge coming from a 
German tank conducting a counter-attack within one 1,000 yards of Allied forces.  This 
Axis offensive was efficiently secured through the naval gunfire support provided by 
Allied cruisers and destroyers.67 Further operational success by the Allied forces in Sicily 
allowed for the capital of Palermo to be occupied by U.S.  Army personnel by the 22nd of 
July.68 
The lessons that not only the United States but other Allied nations learned during 
Operation Husky would prove important for the planning of further landing operations; 
especially Operation Overlord in France.69 The weather issues that delayed the landing 
forces during Operation Husky went to further highlight the importance of weather 
considerations in landing operations planning.  Also, the United States realized training 
issues lead to extended operations in Sicily and with more training time the success 
would have been more quickly achieved.70 Moving forward the Allies realized that the 
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mitigation of these issues would allow them to be a more effective landing force for 
continued landing operations.  These lessons learned by the United States Navy during 
Operation Husky built upon those learned during Operation Torch the prior November 
and made the Allied forces ready for further landing success.71 
The amphibious landing success experienced by Allied forces in North Africa and 
Sicily allowed for further Allied operations in mainland Italy.  Operation Shingle was a 
planned amphibious assault landing in Italy at the town of Anzio.  Anzio is a town on the 
western coast of Italy approximately 35 miles from Rome.  The objective of Operation 
Shingle was to open the road to Rome to the Allies and drive the Nazi forces north of 
Rome.72 To accomplish this goal, the U.S.  VI Corps led by Major General John P.  
Lucas would land in Anzio with naval support commanded by Rear Admiral Frank J.  
Lowry.  Consisting of 28 destroyers, 103 minor warships, and 241 landing crafts, the 
American amphibious force arrived off the coast of Anzio around midnight on January 
22nd with the assault on the beach starting two hours later.73 Calm seas at the time of the 
landing lead to efficient operations with the first loss coming eight hours after the 
commencement of the attack.  The first loss was AM-106 PORTENT, a minesweeping 
ship that sank resulting in the loss of 18 men due to striking a mine.  By the end of the 
first day, over 90% of the initially planned assault was on the beach at Anzio.  The 
success came as a surprise due to issues arising from the preparatory phase of the 
amphibious landing.74 While the initial stages of the landing were a success, the time 
taken by Allied forces to concentrate their forces and consolidate the beach had allowed 
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the Germans to obtain reinforcements and pause the Allied advance through counter-
attacks.  This counter-attack pushed the Allies all the way back to the shoreline.  
However, due to naval artillery and gunfire support to the land units, the Allies were able 
to hold a strong position on the beach until May of 1944.  Allied forces south of the 
amphibious landing penetrated the Gustav Line during Operation Diadem to help finally 
push the Germans north of Rome.  Rome eventually fell on June 4th, 1944.   
More than 23,000 British and American combat casualties with an estimated 
4,400 deaths occurred during Operation Shingle.  Of these 4,400 deaths, 160 were U.S.  
Navy personnel killed at Anzio.  Although the landing took longer than expected and the 
casualties were greater than predicted, Operation Shingle led to a more experienced 
Operation Shingle and the assault on Italy. The Gustav Line crossed by Allied forces 
leading to the liberation of Rome. 
29 
 
amphibious assault force and provided lessons on troop placement and movement for 
future amphibious landings.75 The United States learned an even more important lesson 
on amphibious landings from Operation Shingle; the need for a structured beach and 
properly guided land forces to keep consistent pressure on the adversary.76 During 
Operation Shingle, the Axis land forces were able to regroup and conduct a counter-
assault on the opposing landing forces due to the United States' inability to exhibit 
constant pressure.  Had the United States been able to keep the forces on the beach 
organized and the pressure consistently applied on the adversary, the Axis land forces 
would not have had time to regroup and mount their counter-offensive.  This lesson 
would prove to be of vital interest to the United States and their allies moving forward 
with the Normandy landing occurring just two days after the fall of Rome.   
The Normandy landings, named Operation Overlord, was a planned amphibious 
landing on the French coast over the English Channel.  Landings were to be made by the 
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United States, Britain, and Canada on five different beaches.  Utah and Omaha beaches 
would be attacked by the Americans, while Gold and Sword would be the responsibility 
of the British forces leaving the final beach, Juno, to the Canadians.   
The operation, if successful, was an important strategic land objective for the 
Allied forces.  The Allied forces needed access to the western front in Europe to stage 
further offensive objectives.  The goal was to have the ability to maintain 26-30 divisions 
in the area with the deployment of an additional five divisions per month.77 Deemed 
Hitler’s Festung Europa (Europe Fortress), Western Europe would be a vital asset for 
further successful Allied operations.78 The naval component of Operation Overlord was 
called Operation Neptune and was led by the Royal Navy’s Admiral Sir Bertram H.  
Ramsay.  United States Navy Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest King formed a 
task force to command the cross-channel assault.  Accompanying the stockpile of air 
units stationed in England, all 284 warships, including 5 battleships, 23 cruisers, and a 
plethora of destroyers/destroyer escorts lined up at the rendezvous point of ‘Piccadilly 
Circus”.79  
The Allies had learned from the previous amphibious landings in Italy and North 
Africa that maintaining air superiority in the area of operations, weather, and proper 
naval gunfire support would be vital to mission success.80 The weather was of main 
consideration to tactical planners due to this operational emphasis on air superiority.  
Beach obstacles being exposed to low water was deemed an additional optimal 
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circumstance and would occur during a spring tide.81 Originally scheduled for May 31st, 
194482, the actual invasion did not occur until June 6th due to these weather requirements.  
Time of the day for the invasion was determined to satisfy the requirement in the 
amphibious operations doctrine, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, of permitting 
enough daylight to achieve the first phase of objectives.  In a letter from the Supreme 
Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), Operation Overlord was set to 
have two phases.  Phase 1 was instructed to be “… an assault landing on the 
NORMANDY beaches between the limits of QUINEVILLE in the WEST and 
CABOURG-LES-BAIRS in the EAST, to be followed by early capture and development 
of airfield sites and the capture of the port of CHERBOURG”.83 Following phase 1, 
phase 2 simply enlarged the captured area outlined in phase 1 to the ports of 
CHERBORG, LOIRE, and BRITTANY.84 To accomplish these phases, SHAEF 
inventoried the available naval and ground forces available for use in the operation.  The 
ground forces were to consist of the First US Army Group, 21 Army Group, and requisite 
airborne and ranger forces as deemed necessary, while the naval forces consisted of the 
same units aforementioned.85 The final stage in planning set the main base for the 
invasion as the United Kingdom.   
While most of the amphibious landing was planned out in accordance with 
amphibious doctrine, the Allied forces realized that the invasion was so intricate that it 
may involve deviations from the planning and doctrine.86 
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 Commencing in the early morning of June 6th, 1944, 24,000 airborne personnel 
from the U.S., Canada, and Britain were deployed to land in Normandy.87 At 0630 the 
amphibious landing on the coast of France had officially begun.  While the waves of 
assault on Utah beach was conducted with slight deviation on schedule, the outcome of 
operations on Omaha Beach became increasingly grim.88 Allied forces, accompanied 
with successive waves of reinforcements, were constantly hammered by Nazi gunfire 
further up on the beach.  Destroyer captains were instructed that only half of the 
ammunition carried by the destroyers were to be used during the invasion.  After 
realizing that the situation at Omaha Beach was more severe than expected, destroyer 
captains decided to deviate from this instruction, and conduct an all-out assault on Nazi 
forces in support of the land troops.  In an effort to create a more favorable operational 
environment, naval support fire was directed to provide close fire support to troops on the 
beach from screening possible enemy invasions.89 This support from the naval assets 
required they station so close to the shore that some of the ships were hit by bullets from 
German machine guns and rifles.  These ships experienced damage to their hulls and 
superstructures.90 While this was a significant and positive turning point in the 
amphibious operation, it was also a deviation from the amphibious landing doctrine.  
Historian Craig Symonds spoke of this deviation as “what saved the day for the 
Allies…”.91 
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Naval destroyers provided gunfire support destroying enemy gun positions and 
allowed Allied land forces to advance b on the beach.  In total, 132,500 allied forces were 
able to land ashore on D-Day and establish a strong Allied presence for future shipping of 
supplies.  The follow-on supplies empowered the Allies to push the Germans back to the 
forest of Cerisy by June 11th.92  Resulting in the enemy being too far beyond the range of 
Allied ships.  Reaching the Seine River in Paris in August of 1944 marked the end of the 
amphibious landing operation.93 Operation Overlord was a success and led to further 
Allied operations in Europe.  Almost 11 weeks after the invasion, the Allies liberated 
Paris and continued to move in on the Germans.  Following the liberation of Paris, the 
Germans had to now split their land forces between the eastern front (United States, 
Britain, and Canada) and the western front (Russia).94 With forces being spread thin and 
the losses increasing by the day, the Germans surrendered to the Allied forces on May 7th, 
1945.95 
Operation Overlord is arguably the land equivalent to the Battle of Midway; the 
turning point for land operations in World War 2 that ultimately led to the Allied victory 
over the Nazis.  Operation Overlord proved that with sufficient planning, effective force 
employment, and adequate attention placed upon the operational environment, that the 
United States and its allies could change the course of any war or conflict with its 
amphibious forces.  Allied Forces learned that aspects relating to amphibious doctrine 
like launching the invasion with adequate daylight remaining to complete first phase 
objectives and full implementation of forces were vital to operational success.  They also 
 
92 (F. King 1945) 
93 (Grantham 2015) 
94 (Grantham 2015) 
95 (Grantham 2015) 
34 
 
learned that doctrine and planning is not always something that has to be followed down 
to the number or letter.  While the invasion was a short-term success in helping to win the 
war for the Allies, it was a long-term success in that it led to the further success of 
amphibious landings. 
The lessons the United States learned through Operation Torch, Shingle, and 
Overlord were significant in achieving subsequent success.  Moving forward toward the 
end of the war, the United States sought to cement the lessons learned in Normandy, 
North Africa, and Italy and ensure amphibious landing success in future conflicts.  The 
United States Navy took these lessons and used them to optimize their landing doctrine 
moving forward through War Instructions 1944.   
War Instructions 1944  
War Instructions 1944 is the resulting doctrine from the aforementioned landings 
that outlined standard operating procedures and operations for “ships, fleets, and 
encounters with the enemy”.96 War Instructions 1944 was the subsequent issuance of 
doctrine published by the Chief of Naval Operations following War Instructions 1934.  
The 1944 version was approved by Chief of Naval Operations E.J.  King and was pushed 
out to the fleet on November 1st, 1944.   
 War Instructions 1944 describes the goal of naval command as “the unity of effort 
toward a common objective”.97 The commander, in this case, the highest-ranking in the 
chain of command, may decentralize (delegate) his authority to appropriately trained and 
adequate subordinates.  Decentralizing authority does not relieve the commander of his 
responsibility, it merely passes on the duty of execution.  The proper exercise of naval 
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command occurs when a directive to carry out a task is issued by the commander to 
officers of the immediately preceding echelon.  This directive must be commensurate 
with the directed officer’s authority and responsibility.  If carried out with mutual 
understanding and the subordinate officer carries out the directive as the commander 
would have otherwise, then unity of effort has resulted.  Unity of effort is essential to 
effective naval command.98 
 Six general doctrines of action were set in War Instructions 1944 to govern naval 
operations during the war.  First, commanders were instructed to ensure that their 
subordinate commands understood and concentrated on the objectives at hand and 
subsequently focused all efforts on achieving the set objective.  Secondly, provide 
subordinate units with the materials necessary to utilize maximum force for achieving the 
objective.  Third, conceal weakness and retain the offensive spirit of the unit.  Fourth, 
when attacking the enemy focus on disorganizing them through retaining offensive 
initiative.  Fifth, once initial success has been realized, extend the success to annihilate 
the enemy.  Finally, utilize the element of surprise when attacking the enemy and ensure 
that you and your units are not surprised by the enemy.  The commander will only know 
what resources are needed by his subordinate units if these units understand the mission 
and convey to the commander what resources they need to achieve the objective.  Once 
the commander provides adequate resources to his units, the units are apt for battle and it 
is then back to the commander to set the spirit of his men during periods of success and 
failure.  When succeeding, it is the commander’s duty to extend the victory and fully 
annihilate the enemy while utilizing the element of surprise. 
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All these general doctrines of actions are derived from lessons the United States Navy 
learned through Operation Overlord, Torch, and Shingle.  Operation Torch taught the 
Navy the importance of utilizing maximum force to achieve the objective.  Operation 
Overlord showed the Navy the need to utilize the element of surprise, retaining offensive 
initiative, and having a properly equipped force.     
 The United States Navy learned the importance of a well-darkened ship during 
Operation Overlord.  Successfully carrying out Operation Overlord required both the 
Army and the Navy to utilize the element of surprise through conducting operations 
during the night.  Landing troops during periods of darkness allowed for optimal 
implementation of the element of surprise which was dependent on a darkened ship.  If a 
ship was not properly darkened, then the Army and Navy would not have experienced the 
element of surprise that was instrumental in the success with Operation Overlord.   
An essential foundation for conducting amphibious landings is scouting operations.  
Scouting operations utilize the maximum employment of aircraft and radar.  During 
World War II, the Department of the Navy believed that all scouting operations could be 
conducted with aircraft.99 Although aviation assets were heavily utilized by the Navy 
during World War II, cases of extreme weather, major distance from bases or surface 
assets, harsh sea conditions, and far distances from the enemy require the employment of 
alternative collection assets.100 Regardless of assets utilized for scouting operations, there 
are three phases followed for effective results.   
The first phase is search operation.  Search operations are initiated by an officer who 
designates the area, units to be utilized, and the commander in charge.  To conduct the 
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search operation, the initiating officer identifies the search area and assigns each scout in 
the search operation with specific tasks.  The commander in charge of the search is 
provided information from the scouts to which he provides to the initiating officer as 
frequently and necessary and as possible.101 The information provided from the 
commander in charge of the search to the initiating officer may include but is not limited 
to enemy contacts, friendly casualties significantly affecting the operation, and time-
sensitive information requirements.  The next step of scouting operations is contact 
scouting which encompasses both tactical scouting and tracking.  In contrast to search 
operations, a “scout” in contact scouting refers to an aviation asset instead of a human 
asset.  Unless the main object of the search is to contact the enemy, the scout is to not 
concentrate on making the first contact.  If the scout does contact an adversary force, then 
the scout must focus on collecting information on the unit and reporting the contact to the 
commander.  Surface scouts (ships) who contact enemy vessels or scouts shall only 
engage the enemy if vital to continue the operation.  If attempting to pass through enemy 
units to locate an objective or continue scouting operations, friendly surface vessels 
should attempt to do so without making contact with the enemy.102 When aviation assets 
are the feasible means of locating an objective or developing contacts, they shall be 
effectively employed.  Thirdly, tracking occurs when the adversary is located but is not 
within the striking area of an adequate force.  Once the objective of a scouting operation 
has been located and identified, the senior officer takes the necessary measure to maintain 
the track of the contact.  This tracking is maintained until an adequate unit is within range 
to strike.  The goal of tracking is to maintain and monitor the location of enemy forces a 
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minimum of once per day.  The utilization of sonar mitigates the effects of the intricacies 
and dangers of ocean navigation.  Finally, tactical scouting provides detailed information 
on the enemy through close-quarters collection.  This detailed information is provided to 
the officer in tactical command by the commander (senior officer of the scouts) for 
tactical decision making and planning prior to principal force engagement.  Tactical 
scouting is continued on through the engagement with the transition from surface vessels 
to aviation assets and complimented by flank forces and submarines.  Scouting is a vital 
evolution directly associated with the planning and execution of naval operations during 
World War II.   
 Leading up to Operation Overlord, the United States Navy undertook extensive 
scouting operations to attempt to paint a full picture of the landing operational 
environment.  These scouting operations were vital to the success of Operation Overlord 
because it allowed the United States and other Allied forces to better plan and execute the 
Normandy landing.  This emphasized role of scouting was due to the shortcomings of 
Operation Torch where the United States failed to account for all aspects of the 
operational environment to include the physical environment and also the adversary’s 
capabilities.  Scouting operations allowed the United States to better ascertain the 
capabilities of the adversary forces on the beachhead and be better equipped to combat 
these capabilities.  Moving forward with War Instructions 1944, the United States wanted 
to be sure that scouting operations were utilized to their fullest extent so that landing 






War Instructions 1944 was the culmination of the United States’ amphibious doctrine 
in World War II.  With Landing Operations on Hostile Shores heavily influencing Joint 
Action of the Army and the Navy, the United States went through most of World War II 
following these pieces of amphibious landing doctrine.  After various lessons learned 
through Operations Torch, Shingle, and Overlord, the United States realized that they 
may have found a formula for amphibious success.  Wanting to create an all-
encompassing doctrine to capitalize on these lessons through War Instructions 1944, the 
United States created an experienced-based doctrine that would set their amphibious 
force up for sustained success.  The amphibious landing doctrine for the United States 
throughout World War II had adapted in an effective way that leads to the United States 
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